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UEC Int’l Mini-Conference No.52 23

able power deviations. The maximum power on power control are supported by the simula-
that can be followed under the shrunken flex- tion results. Furthermore, the proposed attacks
ibility attack is assumed to be the sum of the do not require additional information about the
lower and upper bounds of the devices, which, state or parameters of the grid, making them
in the case of just two devices, already matches relatively easy for attackers to execute. The im-
the bus flexibility region. For the second case, pact of power deviations on grid security con-
where the reference signal is inside the flexibility straints needs to be evaluated in future work to
region, no deviation from the first-order behav- assess the risk of such attacks.
ior is observed, but to preempt the discussion
on the measurement attack, a deviation occurs 6.2 Power Measurement Attack
not on regular bases and from the algorithm’s
perspective, a reference signal near the hull but The manipulation of power measurements in a
still within a flexibility region is a regular situa- random, unsophisticated manner or as a denial-
of-service (DoS) attack on the power measure-
tion.
It is worth mentioning that shrinking and en- ments of DERs demonstrates that it does not
larging flexibility regions can occur simultane- endanger the bus controller’s objectives. Fur-
ously, and it can be assumed that the impact on thermore, the results suggest that power mea-
power deviation increases under both attacks. surements have a negligible influence on the op-
timization algorithm. This observation is note-
worthy as there might be more effective algo-
5.2 Power Measurement Attack rithms to achieve a first-order behavior of the
bus power.
The simulation results shown in Chapter 4.2
suggest that finding reference signals to achieve
the first-order behavior of the bus is not de- Acronyms
pendent on the actual power generation or con-
sumption of the DERs. This is because only two ADN Active Distribution Network
violations of this behavior occurred, and one of AMI Advanced Meter Infrastructure
these was observed in the optimization that was
not attacked. Furthermore, even though the un- CPS Cyber-Physical System
perturbed optimization deviates from the first-
order behavior, the attacked optimization does DER Distributed Energy Resources
not. As an initial observation, it appears that IPF Interconnection Power Flow
there exist reference signals r that can transi-
tion the bus from one state to another, leading ICT Information and Communication Tech-
to first-order behavior of the bus, independent nologies
of the power state of the DERs connected to the
bus. IoT Internet of Things
MG Micro Grid
6 Conclusion PV Photovoltaic

6.1 Flexibility Region Attack SG Smart Grid
This work showed that attacks on the flexibil- SH Smart Home
ity regions of DERs can result in deviations
SPC Smart Power Cell
from the requested power by the SPC-Level con-
troller, both by enlarging and shrinking the flex- TSO Transmission Grid Operator
ibility regions. The considerations regarding the
manipulation of the feasible set of the optimiza-
tion problem in equation (5) and the impact